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Corporate Governance: The Revival of an Academic, Professional and Policy Field 
Abstract 
This paper explores the basic concepts of corporate governance in relation to its intellectual 
foundations and historical development. The basic assumption relies on the fact that the 
reinforcement of corporate governance as an academic, professional, and policy field is a 
consequence of the many corporate failures that have occurred in recent years, mainly since 
2002. Most theoretical developments for this new moment in history have been borrowed from 
the same academics and practitioners that reflected and worked on the field after the 1929 
economic crash, with deep origin on general social scientific research. In addition, corporate 
governance is growing as a distinctive business function as well as a set of global prescriptions 
that impact business activities across industries and cultures. The role of the board of directors 
and the ideas on power and accountability remain critical issues in the new 21st century corporate 
governance debates. 
 3
Corporate Governance: The Revival of an Academic, Professional and Policy Field 
 
Introduction 
 Since the beginning of the new 21st century, several corporate scandals have taken place 
in western countries, such as those controversies involving American companies like Enron, 
Arthur Andersen, Worldcom, Adelphia and Tyco. Essentially, Europe has not been different, 
taking into account diverse failures regarding corporations like Maxwell, Parmalat, Kirch, Grand 
Tibidabo or Royal Dutch Shell. Reasons behind such events have ranged from accounting frauds 
to use of insider information in stock markets, as well as simple irresponsible mismanagement of 
corporate assets. Main consequences have been the loss of jobs, wealth, and corporate 
credibility. But several groups in the international community, from politicians to judges, civic 
activists and the media, have blamed the lack of good corporate governance in the companies 
involved. 
 Additionally, the economic crisis of 2002, along with the political crisis of 2001, has 
helped too to generate a situation of public opinion in which corporate behavior is under 
suspicion. This climate produced a revival of concern about corporate governance in terms of 
academic interest, professional development, and political regulation. This paper tries to reflect 
on the concept of corporate governance itself, as well as the underlying intellectual and historical 
conditions that have contributed to its resurgence in these times. 
 
The quest for a holistic definition 
Corporate governance is a relatively new expression, even though concepts and activities 
behind it are as old as human beings. The Oxford English Dictionary (1989, 2nd ed.) defines 
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“governance” in ten different statements. Among them, three are particularly relevant: 
“Controlling, directing, or regulating influence; control, sway, mastery”; “The manner in which 
something is governed or regulated; method of management, system of regulations”; and 
‘Discreet or virtuous behavior; wise self-command”. The verb “govern” includes definitions such 
as “To rule with authority, esp. with the authority of a sovereign; to direct and control the actions 
and affairs of (a people, a state or its members), whether despotically or constitutionally; to rule 
or regulate the affairs of (a body of men, corporation); to command the garrison of (a fort)”; “To 
guide, direct, lead (in some course); to guide to or towards an object”;  “To direct or regulate 
one's actions; to conduct oneself, behave, act (in a specified way)”; “To hold in check, curb, 
bridle (esp. one's passions)”; and “To constitute a law or rule for; to be applicable to as a 
determining principle or limiting condition; to serve as a precedent, rule, or type for; esp. in Law, 
to serve in determining or deciding (a case)”. 
As far as the concept of corporation itself is concerned, some of the main definitions for 
the term in the OED include: “A number of persons united, or regarded as united, in one body; a 
body of persons”; “A body corporate legally authorized to act as a single individual; an artificial 
person created by royal charter, prescription, or act of the legislature, and having authority to 
preserve certain rights in perpetual succession”; and “An incorporated company of traders having 
(originally) the monopoly and control of their particular trade in a borough or other place; a 
trade-guild, a city ‘company’. (Now so called only in legal or formal language.)”. It was a word 
mainly used for municipal institutions. That is why the municipal corporation is “the civic 
authorities of a borough or incorporated town or city; the mayor, aldermen, and councillors. (A 
leading current use.)”. In fact, the dictionary includes the historical background of the 
Corporation Act of 1661, which required “all persons holding municipal offices to acknowledge 
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the royal supremacy, to abjure resistance to the king, and to subscribe a declaration against the 
Solemn League and Covenant, and making ineligible for office all persons who had not within a 
year partaken of the communion as administered by the Church of England”. 
According to Cadbury (2002, p. XV), corporate governance is concerned with “the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled, which is clearly the responsibility of 
their boards of directors”. Monks and Minow (2004, p. 2) have defined it as “the structure that is 
intended to make sure that the right questions get asked and that checks and balances are in place 
to make sure that the answers reflect what is the best for the creation of long-term, sustainable 
value”. Specifically these authors highlight the relationships among shareholders, directors and 
the management as the core object of corporate governance. 
 Mathiesen (www.encycogov.com, 2002) states that "corporate governance is a field in 
economics that investigates how to secure/motivate efficient management of corporations by the 
use of incentive mechanisms, such as contracts, organizational designs and legislation. This is 
often limited to the question of improving financial performance, for example, how the corporate 
owners can secure/motivate that the corporate managers will deliver a competitive rate of 
return”. 
 Colley et at (2005, p. 3) engages in a longer explanation of the phenomenon when they 
say that “today, the public corporation itself operates as a form of representative government. 
The owners (shareholders) elect directors as their representatives to manage the affairs of the 
business. The directors, who as a group are referred to as the board of directors, then delegate 
responsibility for actual operations to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), whom they hire. The 
CEO is accountable to the board of directors, which collectively and individually, is accountable 
to the shareholders. In addition, to its role in selecting the CEO, the board also advises on and 
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consents to the selection of businesses and strategies of the firm as well as oversees results. In 
sum, this system of authoritative direction, or government, is known as corporate governance”. 
Even some professionals like Anand (2008, p. xviii) think that “instead of focusing on Corporate 
Governance as a phrase with a concrete definition, it is much more effective to think of it as a 
state of mind, a concept that is fluid and adaptable to the changing face of commerce”. 
Apart from all these different views on how to define the governance of corporations, it 
has to be stated that the proper form of the corporation as we know it today is a brand new 
contribution in human history, rooted from the end of the 19th century. The principal forms of 
business organizations are proprietorships, partnerships, and corporations. But corporations are a 
particular kind of business enterprise usually distinguished by four main characteristics: limited 
liability for investors, free transferability of shares, perpetual life, and centralized management 
(Romano, 1993, p. 61). 
 To some extent, the founding fact of a corporation is the separation of ownership and 
management, which thereby generates the principal-agent problem. An agency relationship is a 
contract under which one or more persons (the principal or principals) engage another person 
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves some decision-making 
delegation to the agent. The theoretical foundations of the principal-agent problem and 
transaction cost are especially outlined in the works of some of the Chicago school economic 
theorists, such as Alchian, Demsetz and Coase. 
The agency theory is complemented (or even confronted) nowadays with the stakeholder 
approach of the firm. According to Freeman (1984), in the traditional view of the firm, 
shareholders are the owners of the company, and the firm has the duty to increase value for them. 
The firm converts the inputs of investors, employees, and suppliers into products which 
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customers buy, thereby returning profits to the firm. By this model, firms only address the needs 
and wants of investors, employees, suppliers, and customers. However, stakeholder theory 
argues that there are other parties involved, like competitors, political groups, trade associations, 
trade unions, communities, associated corporations, and the public at large. Authors such as Kim 
and Nofsinger (2007) understand corporate governance as a broader social process involving 
several agents, mainly executives, accountants and auditors, directors, investment banks and 
securities analysts, creditors and credit rating agencies, shareholders and shareholder activists, as 
well as regulators. 
Given the assumptions of both agency and stakeholder theories, the most important issues 
in corporate governance are where the power lies and the degree of accountability in place for 
those who exercise it. There are several internal governance structures that mitigate the agency 
problem, such as the board of directors; stockholder voting rights; fiduciary duties; executive 
compensation; and outside shareholders (Romano, 1993, p. 146). But usually, stakeholders’ 
interest is enhanced to a larger extent by external governance structures, especially those related 
with capital markets, regulatory bodies, and civic associations. The market for corporate control, 
especially in the case of takeovers, is a powerful governance tool. Regulations have been 
important to stimulate boards of directors. But the threat of an unwanted takeover offer can be 
considered even more important. This is often the answer of the market to poor board 
performance. In addition, legal and civil pressures of very diverse types have recently shaped the 
governance of public corporations. 
To summarize, corporate governance can be defined as the academic, professional, and 
policy field focused on how business institutions must be ruled, directed, and accounted for the 
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welfare of all people involved. This a role particularly played by the board of directors as the 
representing body of shareholders (the ultimate decision-makers) in order to control the 
management (the immediate decision makers). Directors receive certain powers from 
shareholders and delegate authority to the management of the firm, but they can never delegate 
responsibility. They remain responsible for the corporation oversight according to excellent 
business practices, professional ethics and the general law. 
Diagram 1. Main areas for corporate governance oversight 
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Traditionally, corporate governance has been seen as a business function played by the 
board of directors in terms of internal auditing, legal compliance and risk assessment. But 
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modern corporate governance should go beyond just a checking system in order to enhance a 
proper value creating function of the firm. This includes the rules, direction and accountability 
system of the corporation itself as an economic institution, not only the business or businesses in 
which is involved. In this view, corporate governance is concerned with critical corporate issues, 
particularly corporate finance (financial structure of the firm, capital markets, creditors and credit 
agencies, risk management), corporate communication (investor relations, media, political and 
civic relations, corporate image, internal communication), corporate strategy (in which 
businesses, industries and markets the company operates), corporate culture (which are the 
values, procedures and intellectual capital shared within the firm) and corporate responsibility 
(how the corporation and its members are made responsible, ethically and legally, towards 
stakeholders, the community and the law). 
 
Corporate governance in history: theory and practice 
Corporate governance is a field of inquiry with a long intellectual and practical tradition, 
although has only lately become relevant in the public sphere.  Essentially, the immediate reason 
behind this change is the corporate failures which have occurred in the last few years. But the 
quest for how institutions must be governed in order to fulfill their goals can be found at least as 
far as the writings of some of the main ancient Greek philosophers.  
In the middle ages, municipal and educational corporations in Europe were granted 
perpetual existence and control as a way of insuring independence from the kings. By the 17th 
century, corporations were created by the state for specific purposes, like the settlement of 
colonies. Limiting investors’ liability to capital invested was critical in order to raise significant 
amounts of money. In the late 19th century, factors such as the need for larger firms with more 
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capital, and the social acceptance of private property converged in the creation of big industrial, 
financial and commercial corporations. Even by the 1930s, it was not so clear in the American 
jurisprudence that the right to create corporations was absolute if not aimed to procure a public 
utility to the community (Monks and Minow, 2004). 
Back in the early modern age, the East India Company was granted a Royal Charter to 
operate in 1600. This document is assumed to be the first explicit corporate governance structure 
in history, even though it can be argued that any human institution had an implicit system by 
which it is governed. Almost two centuries later, Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations already 
identified the agency problem and discussed the relationship between the providers of capital and 
the agents that put it into use. Historical developments in the 19th century such as the industrial 
revolution, the progressive transition from mercantilism to liberal capitalism, and the legal 
recognition of corporations and their limited liability were essential factors driving the corporate 
governance of the age. The 1929 economic crash represented an influential cornerstone both in 
corporate governance theory and practice. Just three years after this event, Berle and Mean 
(1932) published the book The Modern Corporation and Private Property, which is recognized 
as the earliest analysis of a critical phenomenon in corporate governance: the separation of 
ownership and management. Before this work, intellectual antecedents can be routed in Veblen’s 
The Theory of Business Entreprise (1904) and Commons’ Legal Foundations of Capitalism 
(1924). 
 Since the late 19th century, but particularly by the 1930s, corporations had turned into 
bigger and more modernized economic institutions where the owners of shares were increasingly 
separated from the daily operations of firms. Between stockholders and managers, boards of 
directors were put into place, as mediating institutions in charge of representation of owners, 
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creation of rules, and control of the management. To some extent, the proper practice of 
corporate governance results from these years. 
Jointly with Berle and Mean’s, two other books on corporate governance seem critical for 
the development of this area of inquiry. Particularly, Jackson’s Corporate Management (1955) 
and Eells’ The Government of Corporations (1962) can be considered cornerstones in the 
academic thought on the field. Jackson focuses especially on selection, qualifications, election, 
organization, compensation, powers, functions and liabilities of directors, nearly half a century 
before these aspects have been considered as critical in good governance processes. Eells 
grounds what he calls “an old art but a new science” (1962, p.3) on general constitutional 
considerations, while focusing on corporate powers, restraints and policies. To some extent, he 
considers general business administration a different field from corporate governance, and 
recognizes the infancy of the discipline and the lack of good textbooks to be used at universities, 
a gap that still exists today. 
However, there are many other examples of essential books in the configuration of the 
discipline. Some of the works focused on functions and responsibilities of directors and 
executives, like Spellman (1931), Burnham (1941), Gordon (1945), Baker (1945), Leighton 
(1946), Copeland & Towl (1947), Lepawski (1952), Dale (1952), Barnard (1953), Drucker 
(1954) and Harbison & Myers (1959). 
Others focused on previous theoretical developments, such as Gulick & Urwick (1937), 
Drucker (1946), Truman (1951), Bendix (1956), Gouldner (1954) and Simon (1957). Some other 
academics and practitioners reflected on the role of business and government and the interaction 
between them, like Merriam (1944), Hale (1953), Buchanan (1958), Kelso & Adler (1958), 
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Mason (1959, ed.), Miller (1959) and Ferry (1959, comp.), while others were centered on the 
historical perspective, such as Hunt (1936), Cochran (1957) and Chandler (1962). 
In sum, it can be stated that roughly between 1930 and 1960, the main theoretical 
foundations of corporate governance were put into place, in part as a long-term intellectual 
consequence of the economic crash of 1929. The governance environment we live in today, in 
terms of the professional and academic resurgence of corporate governance, can be identified as 
a deep consequence of the many 2002 corporate scandals. History, once more, has followed 
similar patterns. Most proper specialized academic works have been done between the 1960s and 
the 1990s, but from the beginning of the 21st century, a new publishing fever is taking place in 
corporate governance. Whether or not ideas containing these books are new and relevant in 
comparison with the pre and post-war publications can be put into question. It must be 
recognized, at the same time, that many of the early 20th century first publications in business 
administration studies included corporate governance considerations, even though none of them 
used the term itself. They constitute the grounding theory of the field, and are comprised of the 
writings of seminal management thinkers such as Taylor, Parker Follet or Fayol; economists like 
Smith, Friedman or Schumpeter; sociologists such as Weber, Lazarsfeld and Parsons; 
communication thinkers like Schramm, Gerbner and Bernays; political scientists like Wilson, 
Laswell and Dahl; and even draw on the work of such important thinkers as Aristotle, 
Machiavelli or Montesquieu. In fact, Aristotelian Politics, The Prince or The Spirit of the Laws 
can be considered at least as important as The Wealth of Nations or The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property in seeking the intellectual foundations of current corporate governance.  
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A new academic and professional field 
At this point, it seems self-evident that corporate governance is a corpus of knowledge 
and a professional activity within business administration and policy which also receives 
contributions from many other social sciences. As stated before, its main theoretical principles 
come from ancient, medieval and modern philosophy, diverse pioneers in the social sciences, and 
some of the early management thinkers. Apart from that, corporate governance is growing as an 
emerging discipline mainly within business schools, even though academics devoted to its study 
come from very diverse backgrounds, as shown in the diagram below. In addition, it is worth 
mentioning that philosophy has provided the grounding for corporate governance; just as 
jurisprudence has incorporated some of the consequences of previous social scientific 
considerations. 
However, it is an emerging academic field still to be recognized as very distinctive from 
other disciplines of management in particular and the social sciences in general. Just as a quick 
measurement of the interest and literature in the field, by December 2007 the search term 
“corporate governance” shows roughly 3,760,000 results in Google, 17,073 references in the 
database Business Source Complete, and 9,863 books and 12 magazine subscriptions in Amazon. 
According to the US Library of Congress catalogue only 287 references include that term in the 
title, while the figure at the British Library amounts to 776 books. The main empirical research 
papers have been published in the gap decades (1960s-1990s), but the lack of a social 
consciousness about corporate governance issues did not help the development of the field. 
Nowadays, the revival of the area is a fact, with both professionals and academics trying to find a 
distinctive space from other related business activities. 
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Diagram 2. Corporate governance contributions from diverse scientific fields 
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Whether or not corporate governance can be already considered a business field apart 
from strategic management is a question which only time will tell.  The situation between 
strategy and governance reflects that in similar/unified fields such as accounting/finance, 
operations/information systems, marketing/sales, and human resource 
management/organizational behavior. To some extent, it depends on the opinions and experience 
of different academics and professionals. 
From a professional standpoint, the development of the modern economy helps corporate 
governance to be recognized as a distinctive field. The corporate sector has grown widely while 
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the state sector has decreased its weight in most economies. Corporations are now bigger, global 
and powerful, which raises the issue of their accountability. Moreover, the development of 
international capital markets requires reliable corporate governance structures for the companies 
to receive equity or debt capital from global investors.  
As cornerstones in the way to institutionalization of corporate governance, in 1977 the 
US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) stated a rule by which all companies with shares 
being traded in the New York Stock Exchange should create audit committees composed of 
outside directors. In 1991, the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance was 
created in the UK. The approval of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbox) has consolidated 
the trend to more a more homogeneous and recognized modern business practice, as far as any 
corporation in the world which want its stocks to be listed on the US markets have to comply 
with this law. 
Since then, governance codes have been launched in most developed countries, such as 
Cadbury and Smith reports in the UK; Olivencia and Aldama reports in Spain; Noerby report in 
Denmark: or King Committee in South Africa. Others have been proposed by international 
organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In other countries, not only 
recommendation codes, but specific laws have been put into place. In the US today, most public 
corporations are governed primarily according to the regulations contained in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) rules and the general principles of the 
Delaware corporate law, the state where most of these companies are incorporated. But despite 
all this diversity of documents, a high degree of convergence of corporate governance standards 
is taking place internationally. 
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Diagram 3. Professionals usually involved in corporate governance activities. 
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Similarly, professional profiles are converging in a global manner. Directors are being 
helped in their tasks by different corporate professionals, particularly accountants, lawyers, 
consultants, public relationists, and internal auditors, as shown above. In addition, a space for 
corporate governance policy activists is being created among universities and research centers, 
international organizations and advocacy groups. Moreover, politicians and regulation agencies 
have more and more to do with the governance of corporations, as dealing with lobbyists and 
civil society institutions is becoming a critical issue for their public service. Industry and 
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consumer associations are playing their role too in the development of this new professional and 
academic area. 
 
Globalization and differentiation on corporate governance standards 
Companies and their boards of directors work within boundaries. They are set by laws, 
rules, and regulations; institutional investors and shareholders; corporate bylaws and internal 
practice codes and values; as well as the community and public opinion. The problem is that 
even though governance regulations are increasingly similar among industries, markets and 
countries, the legal and cultural frameworks have key differences among corporate governance 
conceptions. 
For instance, the World Bank has encouraged countries to develop their own corporate 
governance systems, given that they meet three goals: transparency, independent oversight, and 
accountability. This is one more step to assume that governance of any kind of institutions is 
grounded in universal values that make the most in those countries which enhance democracy; 
capitalism and pluralism. But capital markets have been with no doubt more accessible to 
globalization than the corporate law which governs them. According to Steger et al (2004, p. 2), 
shaping forces of current corporate governance jointly include personalities, capital 
markets/owners, strategy and cultural/legal influences. In addition, Cadbury (2002, p. 236) 
accounts among the factors that are driving changes the concentration of share ownership from 
individuals to institutions; the more interventionist attitude of investors; the need for any country 
to attract international investments; the need by companies to tap world capital markets; the 
worldwide move towards privatization; and the changing expectations which society has of 
companies. 
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Compliance with codes of corporate governance has depended on the degree to which 
shareholders, boards of directors and institutional investors believe in their ability to improve 
performance. But in Cadbury’s words, “belief in the economic value of high standards of 
corporate governance is no longer primarily a matter of faith. It is, however, the combination of 
the soundness of a governance structure, and the integrity and competence of those responsible 
for it, which counts” (2002, p. 240).  
To some extent, it is not possible to demonstrate mathematically that good governance 
standards results automatically in good financial performance. History teaches that, more often, 
companies that are able to deliver outstanding results to shareholders can meet the public interest 
in a satisfying manner as well. For instance, the US Courts recognize that boards of directors 
must conduct businesses in order to enhance corporate profit and shareholder gain. However, 
whether it happens or not, the board must act within the limits of the law; has to take into 
account ethical considerations; and may devote a reasonable amount of resources to 
philanthropic purposes. 
Because of legal, social and business obligations, boards of directors have gone through 
dramatic changes in the last few years. They are taking a more active role in the activities of the 
corporation. Main duties of directors include fiduciary responsibilities, loyalty and fair dealing, 
care, not to entrench and supervision (Colley et al, 2004, p. 10). But they are general obligations 
included in more complex and particular organizational cultures. Steger et al (2004) differentiate 
four types of corporate governance systems: CEO-dominated, checks-and-balances, owner-
centered and consensus-oriented. In addition, Colley et at (2004) have identified that the 
governance model of successful businesses includes some basic elements: a) effective board of 
directors (integrity and competence); b) competent CEO; c) selection of appropriate business or 
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businesses; d) valid business concept; e) appropriate implementation of the business concept; f) 
systems to ensure integrity and legal compliance; and g) full and timely disclosure of the 
performance. 
Some of the most generally accepted good corporate governance practices include the 
separation of roles of the chairman and the CEO, the inclusion of independent/outside directors, 
the medium-sized composition of the board (normally between 10 and 20 members), the creation 
of specialized committees (at least those of audit, nomination, and remuneration), and the 
publication of written corporate governance guidelines or the development of different kinds of 
corporate social responsibility programs. But more importantly, the corporate governance 
function must be able to install a culture of internal control within firms. Internal auditing is 
designed to provide reasonable assurance in economy, effectiveness and efficiency of operations, 
reliability of financial reporting and information systems, and compliance with the law. As 
Colley et al (2005, p. 40) recognize, “it should be noted that internal control goes beyond the 
financial function of the business, to include the much broader areas of operations and legal 
compliance. The internal control function should include managing the control environment, risk 
assessment, control activities, information and communications, and the monitoring efforts”.  
However, emphasis on control processes can help boards to avoid trouble, but it is very 
unlikely to provide real added value to the firm. That is why boards of directors must be diligent 
in complying with their control duties while shaping positively the future of the firm. Otherwise, 
the risk relies on creating bureaucratic structures that just entrench the regular business 
operations. As many other aspects of management, it must be recognized that this one is a matter 
of equilibrium among equally important ends. Steger et al (2004, pp. 1-2) have pointed out four 
dilemmas the boards are confronted with: micromanagement versus detachment (the division of 
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labour and cooperation between management and board); risk taking versus financial control (the 
system and processes to set directions and monitor results); the eroding boundaries in global 
companies versus national frameworks; and the conflicting expectations of stakeholders for the 
license to operate. Reconciliation of these pressures is a critical aspect for modern boards of 
directors. 
Conger et al (2001) have identified seven key activity areas for the board: giving strategic 
direction and advice; overseeing strategy implementation and performance; developing and 
evaluating the CEO; developing human capital; monitoring the legal and ethical performance of 
the corporation; preventing and managing crises; and procuring resources.  
More and more, corporate governance is going well beyond the legal compliance aspect 
through more excellent (though demanding) frameworks. The role of corporate culture on 
financial and ethical performance has been shown as critical in this process. As Cadbury states, 
“the best assurance of consistent performance is that companies should have both good 
governance and strong values, with their system of rewards and promotion based firmly on 
adherence to those values” (2002, p. 241). Colley et al (2005, p. 13) think that “the board must 
establish policies of ethics and disclosure that set the standards of behavior for directors and 
senior executives. (…) The board must also establish policies addressing which decisions require 
board approval, and what information the board should regularly receive about the performance 
of the corporation and its various entities”. The ability of the board leadership to create a positive 
and value-adding corporate culture is essential for any successful corporation. When the board 
fails in this, the whole organization is affected. Consequently, corporate governance is now the 
key business function in order to assure the fitness of corporations in the changing social and 
competitive environment. 
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Conclusion 
This review paper represents a preliminary step in what should be a continued 
exploration of the implications of modern corporate governance in the performance of firms. 
While much more work needs to be done, a few points can be articulated that can hopefully be 
useful in guiding future business administration and policymaking. 
Firms are obviously created to generate profits by meeting people’s needs and wants. 
They have both a clear duty to respect the rights of others; and no obligation to promote the 
interest of others. In addition, corporations operate not only under the laws of governments, but 
also under the laws of markets and societies. It is no laughing matter that some institutional 
investors (such as investment or pension funds) are adopting publicly socially responsible 
investment principles that inform their decisions. This is one more indicator in the legal, social 
and business pressure towards a more transparent, accountable, and responsible corporate 
governance. 
The resurgence of corporate governance in the last few years has followed similar 
patterns than those given after the 1929 economic crash. The intellectual foundations of the field 
were mainly put in the years after the crisis. To some extent, 2002 has meant a significant revival 
of that environment in terms of public concern about the consequences of corporate activities, 
academic research on the topic, and extension of professional profiles devoted to corporate 
governance. Though empirical research has grown substantially in the last four decades, the 
theoretical frameworks in which this knowledge relies come directly from academics and 
practitioners working between the 1930 and 1960. 
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The role of the board of directors as the center of corporate governance activities has 
changed dramatically as a consequence of new legal obligations, social pressures and 
management science developments. Former boards mainly composed by owners maintaining a 
passive attitude have led to modern boards with independent directors which see themselves as a 
critical organizational function capable to add value to the rest of business activities of the 
corporations. Consequently, directors must have their own resources and specialized personnel in 
order to play their role. 
Finally, governance of any kind of institutions has been shown as an essential issue for 
the wellbeing of human societies. The trend towards better corporate governance is influencing 
political and social institutions as well. In fact, the fever for corporate control could be just the 
beginning of higher demands for responsibility and accountability in public and not-for-profit 
institutions. The separation of powers is an accepted principle in modern democracies. The move 
towards corporate governance can be understood too as a demand for corporate democracy. To 
some extent, the management can be considered the executive branch while the board of 
directors would assume the legislative aspect of the political society, composed by all 
shareholders, who would exercise the ultimate judiciary rights in a short of people’s justice. 
Critics of excessive legal pressures towards commercial corporations argue that similar standards 
should be put into place in order to monitor the performance of organizations of any kind. As a 
consequence, all institutions in developed countries, not only business ones, are being 
increasingly required to comply with good governance principles.
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